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critique  of  philosophy   in  Rorty’s  work,   for  all   the  use  he  makes  of  philosophical
concepts.  Rorty’s   interest   in  subjects  and  writers  beyond   the  confines  of  academic
philosophy  makes  his  work  particularly  interesting  to  those  working  in  neigbouring
disciplines, such as literary scholarship. And it is this theme that guides the collection
under  review  here,  a  book  published  as  a  special  number  of  the  German  journal  für
aesthetics  and  general   science  of  art  and   including  contributions  both   in  German
(seven) and English (four). 
2 The  papers   included   in  this  collection  all  take  their  starting-point   in  some  form  of
pragmatist thinking, mostly that of Rorty, in order to address issues of hermeneutics
and   literature   that  are  particularly  relevant   for  scholars  of   literature  who  want   to
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expand   their   theoretical   focus  beyond   the   standard   fare  of  what  often   counts   as
‘theory’ in literature departments. On the other hand, the analyses also point to gaps in
Rorty’s   appropriation   of   other   thinkers,   highlighting   Rorty’s   own   structures   of
reception   and   providing   avenues   for   further   explorations.   In   this   review,   I  will
primarily   focus   on   the   contributions   written   in   German,   however   not   without
mentioning the topics of those in English. 










least  some  kind  of  regulative   idea  of  true  understanding.  Whatever  one  may  think
about  this1 –  Buschmeier   is  consistent  enough  not  to  present  an  account  of  Rorty’s
intentions (22), although it would surely be useful to have a plausible presentation of
such an intention. Buschmeier makes two points that I want to mention in this context:
1)  he  draws  attention   to  what   is  surely  a  serious  deficiency   in  Rorty’s  concept  of









4 It   is   in   line  with  Buschmeier’s  criticism  of  Rorty’s  view  of   literature   that  Richard




he  nevertheless  reaches  this  conclusion  on  the  basis  of  a  comprehensive  agreement





the  case  of  the  oppositions  “discover  vs.   invent,  represent  vs.   intervene,  public  vs.
private,  philosophy   vs.   literature”   and   so  on   (144).  What   this  means   for   literary
scholarship is the following: Rorty considerably downplays the non-inventive part of
literary  scholarship,  presenting  a  lopsided  view  influenced  by  French  literary  critics
but hardly true to the actual workings of literary critics (147). In a Wordsworthian vein,
Eldridge   suggests   poetry   presents   rather   a   transfigurative   than   a   pragmatic
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5 The  German   literary  scholar  Friedmar  Apel  contrasts  the  rather   idyllic  picture  of  a
poeticised culture in Rorty’s sense (and inspired by Dewey) to the much more critical
perspective   of  German   aesthetic   theory   in   the  work   of  Adorno   and  Blumenberg.
Romantic notions of human self-empowerment are much closer linked to the desire to





attention  to  romanticism  as  crucial   influence  on  pragmatism.  This  aspect  has  been
neglected in earlier discussions of pragmatism, according to Schulenberg, but in order
to  understand   the   so-called   ‘renaissance  of  pragmatism,’  one  needs   to   clarify   the
precise relationship between romanticism and pragmatism (174). Rorty’s place in this
confrontation is of great importance, as he has repeatedly dealt with romanticism in
his   essays.   Rorty’s   construction   of   parallels   extends   to   the   rejection   of   the
correspondence theory of truth as well as the predominance of the imagination over
reason. Strangely enough, Rorty still holds on to concepts like ‘progress,’ e.g., when he
suggests   that  “philosophy  makes  progress  not  by  becoming  more   rigorous  but  by











to  be  a  problem  here,  since  one  will  always  have  to  take  recourse  to  some  sort  of
metaphysical  notions   if   one  wants   to  discuss   general   concepts   e.g.   of   ‘language.’
Kohlroß,  who   is  the  author  of  the  only  major  German  treatise  on  pragmatism  and




into   its  consideration   instead  of  regarding   it  as  a  danger   to   its  rationality;  and   if
literary scholarship had also considered the substantial issues expressed in the texts
under   consideration   (161-2).   Rorty   exemplifies   the   possibility   for   this   kind   of
rapprochement  of  philosophy  and  philology  that  would  ultimately  lead  to  a  utopian
place  beyond philosophy  and  philology.  But,  as  Kohlroß  goes  on  to  argue,  there  is  a
surprising insight. For if we ask what really distinguishes philological knowledge from
philosophical  knowledge,   the   answer   is   that   there   is  no  difference   (164).   For,   as
Kohlroß shows, the five myths Rorty recognized as connected to the metaphor of the
mirror  apply  in  equal  manner  to  philology  and  philosophy.  Literary  epistemology  in
the sense ascribed to Rorty would then be a practice that is not guided by a concern for
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the truth; in fact, literature can do without truth – we read Tristram Shandy and Don
Quixote as well as The Critique of Pure Reason or Hegel’s Science of Logic not because they
are   true  but  because  of   the  way   they  present   their  views  of   the  world   (168).  The
knowledge  of   literature   is   thus  a  knowledge  of   the  ways   in  which  convictions  are
formed  by   the  meanings  of   language,   for  meaning,   in  contrast   to   truth,   is   in   fact




this   is  why   the  experience  of  reading  novels  can  offer  ever  new  opportunities   for
reaching general conclusions through the medium of particular stories.






Rorty   and  Derrida,   Jahraus  points   to   the  possibilities   of   art   to   show   that  which
philosophy   cannot   express.  He   reads   a   famous  painting  by  Magritte,   Reproduction
interdite, with Rorty to consider the issues of reflection. Rorty considers reflection as
the  point  of  attack   in  Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature,  and,  according  to  Jahraus,
suggests abandoning a form of thinking in terms of media. Literature as well as literary
scholarship  are  considered  by  Rorty  as   forms  of  reflection  overcome  as  well  as  of
deconstruction  overcome  (94).  In  Magritte’s  painting,  reflection  only  works  with  the
book  represented  (Poe’s  Arthur Gordon Pym)  but  not  with  the  subject   looking   in  the
mirror. Reflection, here, works precisely where it is not necessary: we would have to
see  the  mirror  image  of  the  subject  in  order  to  recognize  it,  whereas  the  book  only















Torberg,  his  reflections  lead  to  a  “significant  reinterpretation  of  Rorty’s  notion  of  a
final vocabulary.” Final vocabularies turn out to be not final but rather present “the
momentary shape of our rational responsiveness to the world and our dynamic ability
to  engage  the  world,  and  to  be  engaged  by   it,  as  thinking  and  thus  ever  changing
agents” (59).
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9 This collection, as my summaries have demonstrated, offers rich food for thought and
is   to   be   recommended   for   anyone   who   wants   to   consider   the   relationship   of








ohne  Methode?  Hermeneutischer  Relativismus   als  Herausforderung,” Philotheos:  International
Journal for Philosophy and Theology, 12, 2012, 3-16.
2.  Christian  Kohlroß,   Literaturtheorie  und  Pragmatismus  oder  Die  Frage  nach  den  Gründen  des
philologischen Wissens, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 2007.
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